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Therefore, properly considered, neither public filing of
archiectural plans nor completion of the structure should
constitute a loss of common law copyright protection.
MICHAEL S. SIMON
"Insanity" At Time Of Trial
Rowe v. State'
Defendant pleaded not guilty to a charge of murder.
He later added a special plea that he was insane at the
time of the commission of the act (insane then). On the
day of the trial, he filed an additional plea that he was
insane at the time of trial (insane now). The jury found
that the defendant was sane "then" and insane "now" and
returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the "second
degree."
The Maryland Court of Appeals, in a four to three de-
cision,' held that the trial court should not have received
the verdict on the issue of guilt or innocence when the jury
had also found that the defendant was insane at the time
of trial. The court, however, went on to sustain the trial
court's instructions that the jury should apply the same
test (the M'Naghten test) with respect to the pleas of in-
sanity "then" and insanity "now", that test being whether
the defendant had sufficient capacity and reason to enable
him to distinguish right from wrong and to understand the
nature and consequences of his act. By accepting this in-
struction, the Maryland court has established a test for in-
sanity at the time of trial contrary to logic and to the
weight of authority.
Most states have codified the common-law rule that an
accused person cannot be tried while "insane ' 3 or suffer-
ing from "insanity. ' 4 Some statutes do not use the word
1234 Md. 295, 199 A. 2d 785 (1964).
2The decision was delivered after reargument. Judge Horney wrote the
opinion for the majority. Judge Henderson delivered the dissenting opinion
in which Chief Judge Brune and Judge Hammond concurred.
a E.g., MD. CODE AN. art. 59, § 7 (1957) ; IDAHo CODE § 19-3301 (1947);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 2945.37 (Page 1953) ; TEXAs ANN. PENAL
CODE tit. 1, art. 34.39 (Vernon 1952).
'MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61.026 (1964) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4803(1948). Cf. REV. CODE WASH. ANN. § 10.76.020 (1961), which allows a plea
of insanity at the time of trial only if accompanied by a plea of insanity or
mental irresponsibility at the time of the commission of the crime.
The procedure for determining defendant's capacity to stand trial varies
with the jurisdiction. Among these diverse statutory procedures are pro-
visions adopting the common-law approach by which the trial judge has
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"insane", but instead forbid the trial of an accused if he is
"mentally ill",5 suffering from a "mental disease or de-
fect",' a "lunatic or habitual drunkard", 7 or "mentally de-
fective"., Those using the word "insane" frequently con-
tain additional terms such as "lunatic",9 "mentally defec-
tive",10 "idiot"," "imbecile",2 "feeble-minded", 13 and "men-
discretionary power either to determine the defendant's mental capacity to
make a rational defense or to impanel a jury to decide the question, KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1531 (1949) ; Micii. STAT. ANN. § 28.967 (Supp. 1963) ;
OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. tit. 29, § 2945.37 (Page 1953) ; provisions for a hear-
ing by the court which do not specifically state whether the judge may
Impanel a jury, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54.40 (1960); IND. STAT.
ANN. § 9-1706a (Burns Cum. Supp. 1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-02.01(1960) ; provisions which seem to indicate that the trial of the issue will
be by the judge without a jury; e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 4244 (1958); N.Y.
CONSOL. LAWS ANN. § 658 (MeKinney 1958); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-48-5(Supp. 1963) ; and provisions for a mandatory jury trial, e.g., GA. COnE
ANN. § 27-1502 (1953); IDAHO CODE § 19-3302 (1947); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 1162 (1951). Only about a dozen states and the federal courts
exclude the use of a jury to decide the defendant's mental competency,
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.06, comment (Tent. Draft Nb. 4, 1955). See also
IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-1706a (Burns Supp. 1964), which provides the same
basic procedures as those cited by the Code. This procedure, which is
recommended by the ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.06 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955), reflects the current trend. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DIsoRDER AS A
CRIMINAL DEFENSE 447 (1954). Similarly, there has been an increased use
of experts in the determination of mental competency, LINDMAN &
MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISA1LED AND THE LAW 361 (1961) ; WEIHOFEN,
op. cit. supra, at 449; Slough & Wilson, Mental Capacity to Stand Trial,
21 U. PITT. L. REv. 593, 609-11 (1960).
Frequently, the statutes or courts have outlined the test of insanity
"now," and have stated who will make the determination, without actually
requiring that the trier of the fact apply that test. WEIHOFEN, op. Cit. 8upra,
at 439. But see CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-6 (8) (1953), which states
that "the jury shall be so instructed: 'The defendant is not to be considered
insane if he has sufficient intelligence to understand the nature and object
of the proceeding against him and to rightly comprehend his own condition
with reference to such proceeding, and has sufficient mind to conduct his
defense in a rational and reasonable manner, althbugh on some other
subject his mind may be deranged or unsound'." (Emphasis added.) For
court decisions which reach the same result, see Brown v. State, 215 Ga.
784, 113 S.E. 2d 618 (1960) and Bingham v. State, 82 Okla. Crim. App. 5,
165 P. 2d 646 (1946).
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 100 (1957) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1222(Purdon 1954) ; 'S.C. CODE § 32-969 (1962) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-513 (5)
(Cum. Supp. 1964).
8 Mo. STAT. ANN. § 552.020 (Vernon Supp. 1963).
" N. MEX. STAT. ANN. § 41-13-3 (1953).8 W. VA. CODE § 6198 (1961).
9 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-110 (1947) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.026 (1964);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1822 (1956) ; N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS ANN. 1120 (McKinney
1944).10 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-40 (1960); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-20-01(1960) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 136.150 (Supp. 1963).
11KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1531 (1949) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.026
(1964); N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS ANN. § 1120 (McKinney 1944).
12 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1531 (1949); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.026(1964) ; N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS ANN. § 1120 (McKinney 1944).
" VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-231 (Supp. 1964); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 957.13
(West 1958).
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tally incompetent". 4 In any case, the result is the post-
ponement of the trial until the defendant has recovered.
By themselves, such terms are inadequate in that they are
imprecise and do not set forth a test of insanity which re-
flects the reasons for making an inquiry into a defendant's
capacity to stand trial.15
The proper test to be used in judging the accused's ca-
pacity to stand trial is quickly revealed when there is an
understanding of why the inquiry is made. Basically there
are two reasons for requiring that the defendant possess a
certain level of mental competence before he is asked to
stand trial.16 The first is that the defendant's assistance, or
as much as he chooses to provide, will aid his counsel in
developing the facts of the case. The testimony of witnesses
can be compared to the defendant's version, discrepancies
can be investigated, and the accused may take the stand
and give an account of the incident in his own words. It is
only with the assistance of a competent defendant that the
jury is made aware of all the facts and circumstances of a
case. If the defendant is unable to appreciate the proceed-
ings against him or the value of certain evidence, informa-
tion which only he possesses may never be made known, he
will be deprived of his complete defense, and will not, in
fact, be tried on the merits. The second reason goes to the
concept of fundamental fairness in the trial proceedings.
Every criminal defendant is accorded the right to choose
and assist his counsel, to act as a witness in his own behalf,
and to confront opposing witnesses. A trial where the de-
fendant is mentally incapable of exercising these rights is,
in reality, a trial where these rights do not exist and where
there is a deprivation of due process. 7
A growing number of states have statutes which prop-
erly reflect this line of reasoning. The Arizona provisions
are typical.
14 18 U.S.C.A. § 4244 (1951).
15 For a general discussion of the many objections to the use of the words
"insane" And "insanity" see PERKINS, CRImINAL LAW 740-46 (1957). For a
brief discussion of how the word "insanity" is being avoided by many
doctors who feel that it has no medical meaning, see Thomsen, Insanity as
a Defense to Crime, 19 MD. L. REv. 271, 280 (1959). See also -Slough &
Wilson, supra note 4, at 595.
16 See LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 357-58; WEHOFEN,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 429-30.
17 Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1899) ; Flynn v.
United States, 217 F. 2d 29 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 930
(1955) ; People v. Burson, 11 Ili. 2d 360, 143 N.E. 2d 239 (1957). Cf. Massey
v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954), where the Supreme Court Said that a defen-
dant might not be insane in the sense of being incapable of standing trial
and yet lack the capacity to stand trial without benefit of counsel.
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"If a defendant is committed to the state hospital for
the reason that he is insane or mentally defective to
the extent that he is unable to understand the pro-
ceedings against him or to assist in his defense, if
charged with a crime, or for the reason that he is found
insane after conviction and prior to pronouncing sen-
tence, he shall be detained in the state hospital until
he becomes sane."18
In other states the courts have supplied proper tests. Iowa
has held that there was reasonable doubt as to defendant's
sanity at the time of trial when hospital physicians were
convinced that defendant was presently ". . insane and
unable to properly make a defense."' 9 California has held
that when an accused's sanity is in question he should be
deemed sane for the purpose of being tried if he is capable
of understanding the nature and object of the proceeding
against him and can conduct his defense in a rational man-
ner though his mind may be deranged or unsound on some
other subject.2 0 The Illinois court has asserted the same
test with the additional requirement that the defendant
be able to cooperate with his counsel.2
No court other than the Maryland Court of Appeals has
applied the M'Naghten test when determining insanity
"now". Some, in fact, have specifically stated that it is in-
appropriate in such an inquiry."2
Maryland's statutory law dealing with "insanity" at the
time of trial is, on its face, in line with the provisions of
"I Axiz. REv. STAT. AN. § 13-1622 (1956). (Emphasis added.) Statutes
with similar provisions are IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-1706a (Burns Supp. 1964);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1531 (1949); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15.267 (1950);
MICH. 'STAT. ANN. § 28.967 (1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.026 (1964);
Mo. STAT. ANN. § 5520.020 (Vernon Supp. 1963) ; N.Y. CONSoL. LAWS ANN.
1120 (McKinney 1944) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-20-01 (1960) ; ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 136.150 (Supp. 1963); 18 U.S.C.A. § 4244 (1951).
19 'State v. Hamilton, 247 Iowa 768, 76 N.W. 2d- 184, 187 (1956). (Emphasis
added.) See also Bingham v. State, 82 Okla. Crim. App. 5, 165 P. 2d 646
(1946) ; Commonwealth v. Novak, 395 Pa. 199, 150 A. 2d 102 (1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 882, rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 926 (1959).
10 People v. Merkouris, 46 Cal. 2d 540, 297 P. 2d 999 (1956), 48 CAlIF. L.
REV. 318 (1960). See also State v. Kelly, 192 Kan. 641, 391 P. 2d 123 (1964).
21 People v. Bender, 20 Ill. 2d 45, 169 N.E. 2d 328 (1960). See also State
ez rel. Townsend v. Bushong, 146 Ohio Sup. Ct. 271, 65 N.E. 2d 407 (1946);
Morrow v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 21, 224 S.W. 2d 481 (1949).
22 See Brown v. 'State, 215 Ga. 784, 113 S.E. 2d 618 (1960), Note, 39 TEXAS
L. REV. 505 (1961) ; State v. Kelly, 192 Kan. 641, 391 P. 2d 123 (1964) ;
Bingham v. State, 82 Okla. Crim. App. 5, 165 P. 2d 646 (1946) ; Common-
wealth v. Novak, 395 Pa. 119, 150 A. 24 102 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
882, rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 926 (1959).
2 MD. CODE ANN. art. 59, §§ 7-12 (1957).
1964] 445
446 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIV
other states.' Article 59, Section 7 allows a defendant, at
the time of pleading to the indictment or information, to
file a plea ". . . alleging that the defendant was insane or
lunatic at the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
... and/or that the defendant is insane or lunatic at the
time of the trial." It is the task of the jury, when so di-
rected by the court, to determine ". . . whether he [the
defendant] be sane at the time of the trial."25 This is done
at the conclusion of the trial, and the jury's finding as to
"sanity now" is given at the same time the verdict is ren-
dered on the question of guilt or innocence. The section
also grants the trial court discretionary power and authority
to order an examination of the mental condition of a defen-
dant by the Department of Mental Hygiene at any time
before trial.
Whenever the trial court orders an examination of the
defendant as a preliminary matter, Section 9 provides that
the Department of Mental Hygiene will inquire ".
whether such person is at the time of such inquiry insane
or lunatic, or of such mental incapacity as to prevent such
persons from properly conducting his or her defense or
advising as to the conduct of his or her defense. . . ." If
the Department finds the defendant unable to aid or con-
duct his defense, "the court shall in its discretion . . .,26
direct the person to a state mental institution until he has
recovered, and the proceedings will be stayed until that
time.
The only time the above statutes have been construed
together was in Hamilton v. State. In that case, the court
24 The interpretation of the statutes and what they might mean in a
situation such as the principal case has been a source of conjecture in the
past. See Chasanow, Civil and Criminal Commitment of the Mentally Ill in
Maryland, 21 Mn. L. Rv. 279, 297-98 (1961).
25 Article 59, Section 7, states that the jury or the court is not required
to state in its verdict that the person charged was sane at the time of the
commission of the crime and/or sane at the time of the trial, and if it does
not state as to the sanity of the defendant it shall be conclusively presumed
that it found the defendant to be sane. The statute continues with the
provision that in any case where the plea of insanity or lunacy is inter-
posed, the court shall, upon application by the state or the defendant, or
may, upon its own motion, direct any jury impanelled to try such case to
find specially, by its verdict, whether the accused was sane at the time of
the commission of the crime and whether he be sane at the time of trial.(Emphasis added.)
21 MD. CODE ANN. art. 59, § 9 (1957).
27 225 Md. 302, 170 A. 2d 192 (1961). The other cases citing Sec. 7 are
Cook v. State, 225 Md. 603, 170 A. 2d 460 (1961), where the court declined
to construe Sec. 7 when the issue was not clearly before it; Hazel v. State,
226 Md. 254, 263, 173 A. 2d 187 (1961), which said that Secs. 7, 9 and 11,
are discretionary means by which the trial court may obtain information
as to the defendant's sanity and are not mandatory conditions prior to
proceeding with the trial; Tull v. State, 230 Md. 596, 188 A. 2d 150 (1963),
which held that the trial court committed no error in not granting the
ROWE v. STATE
paraphrased Sections 7, 9 and 1128 and concluded that these
sections should be read together. The court said that "...
it is apparent that the statutes were enacted to provide,
and in fact one of them (§ 9) specifically prescribes, a rule
of procedure common to all by which to ascertain before
trial whether or not a defendant charged with a criminal
offense is capable of making a rational defense to the
charge. '29 If Sections 7 and 9 are read together, it would
seem that the test set forth in Section 9 to be used by the
Department of Mental Hygiene would also be the test to
be used by the jury when, pursuant to Section 7, it deter-
mines ". . . whether he [defendant] be sane at the time of
the trial." The majority of the court apparently rejected
the interpretation furnished by the Hamilton case.
When the court in the principal case saw the word
"sane" in Section 7, it concluded that "since the Legislature
has not seen fit to provide a different test for determining
insanity now, as distinguished from insanity then, and
[since] the M'Naghten test has been applied in this state
for some seventy-five years, it seems proper for the courts
to continue to apply this test until such time as the Legis-
lature changes the same. '3 0
The court refused to read into the word "sane" found
in Section 7 the test found in Section 9 (whether a defend-
ant has such mental capacity as to allow him to properly
conduct his defense or advise his attorney as to its con-
duct). There seems to be little logic behind this. One
might argue that the Section 9 test should not be applied
in Section 7 because the two sections are distinguishable
and mutually exclusive. A look at the two sections, how-
defendant's motion for a separate trial on the issue of insanity; Berman v.
Warden, 232 Md. 642, 193 A. 2d 551 (1963), which held that even if the
defense of insanity was urged by the defendant, failure to return a
separate verdict on such defense was not jurisdictional error but at most
a technical error in procedure which would not nullify the sentence; and
Berman v. Warden, 223 F. Supp. 76 (D. Md. 1963), which denied Berman's
writ of habeas corpus when petitioner contended that the verdict was void
because it did not specifically find that he was sane at the time of the
commission of the crime and at the time of trial. The cases citing Sec. 9
are, in addition to the Hamilton case, the Hazel case and State v. Ewell,
234 Md. 56, 198 A. 2d 275 (1964), where the court said that the trial judge
correctly held that the time spent in the State hospital should have been
credited against the original sentence.
28 Section 11 deals with persons arrested and committed in default of
bail to await further proceedings, and appears to be or is alleged to be
insane or lunatic. Under this section, the court is authorized to commit him
to an institution for the care of the insane. The Department is to examine
him promptly and report its findings to the court.
19 Hamilton v. State, 225 Md. 302, 307, 170 A. 2d 192 (1961). Cf. Devilbiss
v. Bennett, 70 Md. 554, 17 Atl. 502 (1889).80 234 Md. 295, 305-06, 199 A. 2d 785 (1964).
1964]
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ever, reveals three insignificant differences which are in-
sufficient to support the conclusion that the test of capacity
to stand trial set out in Section 9 was not intended to be
applied in Section 7. These differences are the language
used, the persons making the determination, and the stage
in the proceedings at which the accused's capacity to stand
trial is determined. There is, first of all, the use of the
word "sane" used by itself without elaboration in Section
7; whereas what appears to be the proper test of compe-
tency to stand trial is spelled out in Section 9. Secondly,
Section 7 states that the jury is finally to determine the
defendant's sanity at time of trial; while under Section 9,
the Department of Mental Hygiene may investigate, as a
preliminary matter, the capacity to stand trial. The jury
is entirely capable of applying the test used by the De-
partment of Mental Hygiene. The jury has long applied
the M'Naghten rule in determining criminal responsi-
bility,31 for many years without the assistance of testimony
by psychiatrists. The third difference has to do with the
stage in the proceedings when a man's capacity to be tried
is explored. Section 7 specifies the procedure to be used
when a plea of insanity or lunacy is interposed at the
trial, and provides that the jury must determine this
matter; whereas Section 9 deals with the determination of
capacity to stand trial as a pre-trial matter. Logically, the
closer a person gets to trial, the more the test of mental
capacity to stand trial should reflect the basic purposes
which prompt a concern for a defendant's mental capacity.
The Maryland court recognized these considerations in
1930 when it stated:
"If, however, the party be found insane at the time of
the trial so as to incapacitate him, the law, out of ajust and compassionate consideration for his condition,
will not try him of the crime charged by suffering a
conviction to be received, but will stay the charge and
await such time when his reason shall be sufficiently
restored, so as not to prevent him from properly con-
ducting or advising as to the conduct of his defence,
although he may have been of sound mind at the time
the alleged crime was committed. The reason for this
rests upon weighty considerations, for who knows
better than the party charged the facts and the wit-
nesses that may establish his innocence, and these
may be his solitary and incommunicable possession by
81 Deems v. State, 127 Md. 624, 96 AtI. 878 (1916).
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force of his mental condition. It is indisputable that
an insane person can not make a rational defence." 2
Yet now the Maryland court would have the jury apply
the M'Naghten test, a test to determine criminal responsi-
bility,3 when determining whether the accused has the
competency to stand trial. The determination of mental
unsoundness in a criminal defendant should give rise to
different "insanity" tests depending on the stage of the
proceedings and the reason for making the inquiry. 4 This
is especially true as between insanity "then" and insanity
"now,.35
Insanity "then" goes to the defendant's responsibility.
The inquiry is whether, at the time of the act charged, the
defendant was so mentally disordered under the legal test
of responsibility36 as to lack the requisite intent and there-
fore not to be punishable for his acts. A test to determine
responsibility has no valid application as a test to deter-
mine capacity to stand trial.
The question of the defendant's criminal responsibility
has received more attention by far than the question of the
propriety of proceeding against an accused who, due to
mental deficiency, cannot properly defend himself against a
charge which exacts a penalty of loss of life or liberty. This
is so despite the assertion that any reform in the method of
trying persons alleged to be insane probably will come
through improving the means for preventing the trial of
mentally diseased and deficient persons, rather than through
a change in the substantive laws or procedures relating to
responsibility.37 A statement of the correct test of a defen-
dant's fitness to proceed with the trial is merely a start in
the effort to grant one who is mentally ill proper protec-
tion as he progresses through the criminal proceedings.8
82 Price v. State, 159 Md. 491, 499, 151 Atl. 409 (1930).
3' Taylor v. State, 187 Md. 306, 49 A. 2d 787 (1946) ; Deems v. State, 127
Md. 624, 96 Ati. 878 (1916); ,State v. Spencer, 69 Md. 28, 13 Atl. 809 (1888).
3, See WEHOFEN, Op. cit. supra note 4, at 428-74. See also Chasanow,
supra note 24, at 279. See also Note, 15 MD. L. REV. 255 (1955).
35 For courts which have specifically recognized a distinction between the
two, see note 22 supra.
81 There are, currently, four tests of criminal responsibility in greater or
lesser use in the United States. The M'Naghten rule; the M'Naghten rule
accompanied by the irresistible impulse test; the New Hampshire or
Durham test (the "product" test); and the test recommended by the
ALI's MODEL PENAL CODE.
", WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 428. Slough & Wilson, supra note 4,
593. Of. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.04 comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
88 For other discussions of problems related to present "insanity" and
criminal procedure, see generally WEIHOFEN, supra note 4, at 428-74;
Figinski, Commitment After Acquittal on Grounds of Insanity, 22 MD. L.
1964]
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By the decision in the principal case, it is evident that it
is up to the legislature to state clearly the test to be applied
by the trier of fact when deciding whether the defendant
is competent to stand trial. Such a test should reflect the
reasons for determining the defendant's competency at this
stage in the proceedings.
J. B. POWELL, JR.
The Immunity Doctrine Under Attack
Wangler v. Harvey1
Defendant, a New York resident, was devisee of prop-
erty located in New Jersey, and also was named executor
of the estate in the will. Plaintiff, a New Jersey real estate
broker who wished to sell the property, alleged that she
was injured while being escorted by the defendant through
the devised premises.
A suit based on these facts was instituted by plaintiff in
New Jersey against defendant in his capacity as executor
of the estate. Since defendant was a nonresident, this suit
was instituted by serving process upon the surrogate pur-
suant to the power of attorney required to be filed with the
surrogate.2 During the course of the trial, defendant was
served with summons and complaint which named him as
defendant in his individual capacity, as beneficiary under
the will.
Defendant moved to quash the service of the summons,
arguing that as a nonresident of New Jersey in the state
solely for the purpose of attending court proceedings he
was immune from service. The Superior Court's granting
of this motion was reversed on appeal.
The appellate court rejected the doctrine of immunity
for nonresident plaintiffs and defendants, stating that it
Rrv. 293 (1962), which discusses the procedure in Maryland for determin-
ing whether a prisoner, exonerated from punishment because insane at
time of commission of the act, will go free or be detained in a mental
hospital; Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Delen-
dant, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 832 (1960), which deals with the Federal Pre-
Trial Commitment Statute and suggests that the procedure be amended to
provide that if the court is of the bpinion that the defendant is incom-
petent, a ruling to this effect should be deferred if counsel raises a matter
for pre-trial determination or counsel alleges a good-faith defense on the
merits and chooses to go to trial on the merits, notwithstanding defen-
dant's incompetency; and Hazard & Louisell, Death, The State, and the
Insane: Stay of Ex'ecution, 9 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 381 (1962), which explores
the rationale behind not punishing a prisoner who is presently insane.
1 41 N.J. 277, 196 A. 2d 513 (1968).
2 N.J.S.A. 3A: 12-14 (1953).
